Judges' perceptions of expert reports: The effect of neuroscience evidence. by Moulin, V. et al.
1 
 
Judges’ perceptions of expert reports: the effect of neuroscience evidence 
Valerie Moulin, Caroline Mouchet, Tessa Pillonel, G-M Gkotsi, Bernard Baertschi,  
Jacques. Gasser, Benoit Testé 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 
 
 
 
Corresponding author: Valerie. Moulin, Maitre de Conferences, Unit for Research in legal Psychiatry and 
Psychology, Institute of Forensic Psychiatry, Department of psychiatry, Lausanne University Hospital (CHUV), Site 
de Cery, Bat. Les Cèdres, 1008 Prilly, Lausanne, Switzerland :  
Mail: Valerie.Moulin@chuv.ch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Abstract 
This article explores the impact of neuroscience evidence on how expert reports are perceived and their 
effects on the decisions made by trial judges. Experimental psychology has demonstrated a number of 
cognitive effects arising from exposure to neuroimaging data which may bias judgments and lead to 
(mis)interpretations that can affect decisions.  
We conducted a study on a sample of 62 Swiss and French judges in order to determine whether their 
perceptions of the credibility, quality and scientific basis of a psychiatric evaluation of a criminal defendant 
vary according to whether or not the evaluation includes neuroscientific data. Quantitative analyses were 
conducted in order to evaluate significant differences between the two conditions (one-way analyses of 
variance) and moderation and conditional analyses to examine whether the participants’ sex and length 
of professional experience moderated the effect of the conditions. Terminological and thematic analyses 
were carried out on open questions.  
Quantitative and qualitative results suggest that the presence of neuroscience data in an expert report 
affects judges’ perceptions of the quality, credibility, and scientificity (reliability, objectivity, scientific 
basis) of the report, and the persuasiveness of the evidence it provided. Moreover, this phenomenon was 
stronger in more experienced judges than in less experienced judges. 
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1. Introduction  
The inclusion of neuroscience evidence in psychiatric assessments of criminal defendants has aroused 
great interest(Aggarwal, 2009; Greely, 2012; Looney, 2009; Sandys, Pruss, & Walsh, 2009), but also a certain 
amount of reserve and considerable debate among scholars, lawyers and forensic practitioners(Kulynych, 1997; 
Larrieu, 2012; Oullier & Basso, 2012; Roberts, 2006). Neuroscience evidence was first introduced in the 1970s in 
the United States. Since then, its use has increased substantially in both the United States and Europe, especially 
during the last ten years (as the science has advanced). In 2011, France became the first country to introduce 
specific legislation covering the use of neuroimaging data in expert reports, via a bill modifying the country’s 
laws on bioethics (Article 16-14 of the Civil Code, created by Act n°2011-814 of July 7, 2011).   
For some authors, neuroscientific discoveries offer the possibility of providing the courts with more 
reliable and more objective evidence, thereby reducing the potential for error associated with traditional 
psychiatric/psychological evidence, which has been frequently criticized in recent years for being subjective, 
unreliable and lacking in scientific rigor (Byk, 2012; Lamparello, 2010; Ouiller, 2012). Neuroscience evidence, 
produced by techniques such as structural and functional neuroimaging, is most commonly used during trials, 
often by the defense, to demonstrate and “objectivize” psychopathological or neurobiological disorders that 
may be linked to the violent behavior of which the defendant is accused(Gkotsi, Gasser, & Moulin, 2018). 
Although advances in neuroscientific research are likely to greatly improve understanding of people and 
people’s behavior, the use of such data in criminal trials raises numerous scientific, epistemological, technical, 
and ethical issues(Gkotsi & Gasser, 2016; Oullier & Basso, 2012; Pignatel & Oullier, 2014). One such issue is the 
impact of neuroscience evidence on how expert reports are perceived and their effects on the decisions made 
by trial judges.  
 Neuroimaging data has great persuasive power, which raises the question of how such data influence 
judges’ perceptions of expert reports (Oullier & Sauneron, 2009; Pignatel & Oullier, 2014), most notably in terms 
of whether neuroscience evidence is perceived as more scientific than other types of evidence (Munro & Munro, 
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2015). Neuroscience evidence, like all forms of scientific data presented during trials, may be considered as a 
“scientific truth” whose validity is attested by the highly technical process involved in obtaining it, and therefore 
accorded greater value (Larrieu, 2012; Roskies, 2006). Even though the inquisitional system (the most common 
system in Europe) allows judges to assess freely the value of the evidence presented, the latter generally tend 
to give more weight to science-based information (Larrieu, 2012; V. Moulin & Palaric, 2013; Oullier & Sauneron, 
2009). Experimental psychology has demonstrated a number of cognitive effects arising from exposure to 
neuroscientific explanations and/or neuroimaging data and which may bias judgments and lead to 
(mis)interpretations that can affect decisions.  
 Several studies have investigated perceptions of neuroscience data and their impact, especially 
concerning evaluations of the “quality” of a scientific explanation or argument (Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, 
Rawson, & Gray, 2008), experimental study showed that readers (who were not neuroscience specialists) 
evaluate an argument as being of high quality when it contains this type of information, even when the 
explanation has flaws and/or when the data do not provide relevant information. Conversely, readers are more 
likely to recognize weaknesses when neuroscience data are not included. Hence, neuroscience data appears to 
make explanations more satisfactory, most notably by masking their shortcomings. A variety of explanations for 
this phenomenon have been suggested. One such explanation is the tendency for people to view the so-called 
“soft” sciences, such as the social sciences and psychiatry, - as less reliable, less valid, and less rigorous than 
“hard” sciences, such as physics and biology (Munro & Munro, 2015; Simonton, 2009). Hence, when arguments 
incorporate neuroscience data, rather than being based on psychological/psychiatric analyses alone, they are 
judged to be of higher quality and more valid, and participants express a greater degree of agreement with the 
expert on the pathology described (Munro & Munro, 2015). The reasons for this are related to the fact that 
explanations containing technical language are perceived as more scientific, even when they are not (Munro & 
Munro, 2015).  
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 Another effect is the result of a natural tendency to prefer simple, even reductionist, explanations for 
complex phenomena (Crommelinck, 1995). Neuroscientific explanations are based on concrete images of the 
brain, rather than non-observable, abstract concepts, as is the case for psychological explanations, and this may 
contribute largely to their appeal (Gurley & Marcus, 2008; McCabe & Castel, 2008) (Henson, 2005). Because 
images of the brain provide a physical basis for “revealing” abstract cognitive processes, they could have great 
persuasive power and could therefore be likely to impact evaluations of an argument’s credibility. However, 
research on this matter has evolved in the light of new data: recent meta-analyses do not confirm that  brain 
images can affect jurors’ judgments (Schweitzer et al., 2011), however neuroscience evidence was found to be 
more persuasive than psychological evidence. The disappearance of the effect of neuro-images in the jurors’ 
perception could be attributed to the fact that people have gotten more used to neuroscience evidence 
(Schweitzer et al., 2011).  
 These effects are not specific to neurosciences; they are also valid for other sciences and thereby show 
the wider importance of examining the influence of scientific data on judges’ decisions. The particularity of 
neuroscience data is that they are capable of generating them and are therefore likely to have particularly great 
persuasive power (Weisberg et al., 2008). This research suggests that including neuroscience evidence in an 
expert report may impact the way the report is assessed by non-specialists, such as judges, whose work requires 
them to take into account such reports. 
 Very few studies have compared professional judges’ perceptions of evidence including neuroscientific 
data versus “traditional” expert reports [most studies include samples of participants with no training in or 
experience of the justice system (mock jurors) or jurors (Schweitzer et al., 2011)], and those to have done so 
have been conducted in countries with an adversarial system (relevant literature does not include  any studies 
carried out in European countries with inquisitorial systems).  
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 In this light, we decided to carry out a study on a sample of Swiss and French judges in order to 
determine whether their perceptions of the credibility, quality and scientific basis of a psychiatric evaluation of 
a criminal defendant can vary according to whether or not this evaluation includes neuroscientific data (a written 
description of a structural neuroimaging MRI scan). 
 
2. Procedure and method  
2.1 Study sample 
 We asked 100 judges (50 Swiss and 50 French), practicing within inquisitorial justice systems, to take 
part in the study. We received responses from 62 of these judges (21 Swiss judges and 41 French judges).  
 
Recruitment of the judges  
 We recruited Swiss judges via letters sent to all the public prosecutors and court presidents in the 
country’s French-speaking cantons, and then to every magistrate. French judges were recruited from judges 
attending continuing training courses in Paris. Participation in the study was entirely voluntary and we 
guaranteed that all data collected would be anonymous.  
Criteria for inclusion in the sample 
 Our sample consisted of judges who use expert reports during trials (prosecutors, examining judges, and 
trial judges), without taking into account characteristics such as sex, experience, or geographical location.  
 
2.2 Practical case: expert reports 
 The research was presented orally, and then judges who so wished could participate. A document was 
given to the judges in the form of a clinical case followed by questions (questionnaire). The document included 
handover instructions (reading the clinical case and answering questions). It then collected sociodemographic 
information and information on the functions performed and the number of years of experience. After reading 
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the clinical case, the judges were invited to answer the open questions (text) and closed questions (Likert scale) 
directly on the document. They had the time they needed to read and answer the questions (no time limit). They 
then had to file the document with someone who collected the questionnaires. 
 In order to evaluate the effects of neuroscientific evidence on judges’ assessments of expert reports and 
on the decisions they take, we asked the judges to read one of two expert reports describing a clinical case study. 
One of the reports included neuroscientific data while the other report did not. The reports we used were 
inspired by real cases so we could provide the judges with a realistic, concrete situation (Hughes, 1998). The 
report was written like a traditional expert report. A traditional report contains separate parts :1/ the offense 
mentioned in the criminal report based on the review of records; 2/ anamnestic data (based on observation, 
clinical interview psychological tests,  complementary sources); 3/ the psychological status and psychiatric 
diagnosis based on observation, clinical interview,  psychological tests and complementary sources) ; 4/ the 
offense as presented by the subject; 5/ a discussion section, which takes into account all of the previous points 
in order to argue and debate to the specific questions asked by the judges. 6/ a precise answer to each question 
asked by the judge. 
 The base report was identical for both conditions, the only difference between the two conditions being 
whether or not the report included neuroscience data. The first report "condition without neuroscience data" 
(CwithoutN) did not contain neuroscience data; the second report "condition with neuroscience data" (CwithN) 
contained the data mentioned below. As a result, we were able to compare the two groups (CwithN and 
CwithoutN) while controlling for the information contained in or absent from each report (Hughes & Huby, 
2002). The report given to the judges in the CwithN group contained the following neurobiological information, 
drawn from a database of real court cases compiled as part of a larger study (Moulin, Gkotsi, Mouchet, Pillonel, 
& Gasser, 2017): “the neurobiological evaluation conducted by Doctor F. using an MRI scanner detected “the 
presence of lesions in the frontal lobes of the brain which could have been produced by accidental traumas”. “An 
evaluation of the brain’s structure (using morphometric techniques), carried out to analyze the morphology of 
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the cerebral cortex, showed statistically significant differences in the structure of Mr. M’s brain compared with 
a group of subjects of the same sex and same age group. The morphological analyses revealed “differences in 
the density of the grey matter in the central zones of the brain, particularly in the area linked to the inhibition of 
automatic behavior and aggressive reactions”. The discussion section included a further comment about the risk 
of reoffending: “it (impulsiveness) could be explained by the lesions in the frontal lobes and the differences in the 
density of the grey matter revealed by the analysis of the brain’s structure”. 
 
2.3 Procedure 
 We divided the judges into two groups of 50 people. Judges in one group were given a report containing 
neuroscientific data; judges in the other group were given a report that did not contain this type of data.  
We asked the judges to read the report and then answer a number of closed and open questions, most notably 
with respect to criteria relating to its scientificity (objectivity, reliability, scientific basis), and to evaluate the 
quality, relevance, credibility, and persuasiveness of the information it contained. These criteria were evaluated 
using 7-point Likert scales (e.g., 1 = not at all scientific, to 7 = very scientific). Three criteria (credibility, 
objectiveness, and persuasiveness of the information) were followed by open questions.  
 
2.4 Analysis methodology of the data  
 We carried out quantitative analyses on the judges’ Likert-scale responses in order to highlight trends 
(descriptive statistics) and detect any significant differences between the with and without neuroscientific data 
conditions. Differences between groups were analysed using one-way analyses of variance. We also conducted 
moderation and conditional analyses to examine whether the participants’ sex and length of professional 
experience moderated the effect of the conditions on evaluations of the report. All these analyses were 
conducted using PROCESS for SPSS [Model 1, (Hayes, 2013)]. 
We subjected responses to the open questions to terminological and thematic analyses (Blanchet, 2007). 
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3. Results 
3.1 Description of the study sample  
Table n°1 
 
The study sample consists of 62 judges: 15 prosecutors, 19 examining judges and 22 trial judges. The 
average age is 44 years; 27 men and 35 women; with an average of 13 years of experience. 
 
3.2 Quantitative results 
3.2.1. Differences between the With and Without neuroscientific data conditions 
Table 2  
 We gave clinical cases with and without neuroscientific data to the same number of judges (50 judges 
in each condition), but we obtained more returns for CwithN (N = 40) than for CwithoutN (N = 22). 
Results show significant differences between the two conditions (CwithN, CwithoutN) for all the items 
evaluated. The judges considered the expert report including neuroscientific data to be more relevant, more 
objective, better quality, more reliable, and more credible than the report without such data. Furthermore, they 
found the expert’s arguments to be more persuasive and that these arguments had a greater scientific basis 
when the report included neuroscientific data than when such data was absent.  
 
3.2.2. Effects of participants’ sex and length of professional experience 
We tested whether participants’ sex and length of professional experience (M = 13.15 years, SD = 8.75, 
min = 2, max = 35) moderated the impact of neuroscientific data on evaluations of the report. Neither the main 
effect of participants’ sex (ps > .055), nor the interaction between participants’ sex and experimental condition 
were significant (ps > .11). Hence, we can conclude that the effect of the conditions did not vary as a function of 
the judges’ sex. 
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On the other hand, we found a significant interaction effect between condition and participants’ 
professional experience for three items: reliability, F(1, 52) = 4.47, p = .039, credibility, F(1, 51) = 4.63, p = .036, 
and persuasiveness, F(1, 50) = 4.22, p = .045. The interaction was also marginally significant for quality, F(1, 54) 
= 3.17, p = .081. The main effect of length of professional experience was never significant (ps > .25). 
Table 3  
When the expert report contained neuroscientific information, length of professional experience was 
positively and significantly related to evaluations of the report for all seven items except objectiveness (see table 
3), but this relationship was never significant when the report did not contain neuroscientific information.  
 
In addition, in this latter case the relationship between length of professional experience and 
evaluations of the report was negative for all seven items except objectiveness. These findings suggest that 
greater experience may lead professional judges to evaluate “traditional” psychiatric evidence more negatively 
and more critically but to evaluate “modern” psychiatric evidence containing neuroscientific data more 
positively. 
 
3.3. Qualitative results: analysis of answers given to the open questions 
 Items evaluating the judges’ perceptions of the reports’ credibility, persuasiveness, and scientificity 
were followed by open questions asking respondents to indicate the reasons underlying their Likert-scale 
responses. The judges did not all reply to all the open questions, which is why there are differences in the 
numbers of responses reported for each. 
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Table 4  
3.3.1. Credibility of the expert report 
We asked the judges to state why they did or did not find the report credible. The degree to which a 
document is considered credible, in other words, worthy of belief, depends on the reader’s opinion of the 
veracity and/or verifiability of its source and, by extension, his or her overall confidence in the information. 
Results showed opposite trends in the two conditions. In line with the quantitative trend provided by 
the Likert-scale evaluations, in CwithoutN more arguments refer to the report’s lack of credibility, whereas in 
CwithN more arguments refer to its credibility. 
-In CwithoutN - 5 responses referred to the report’s credibility, indicated by “its coherence, its measured tone, 
the fact it takes into account a variety of positive and negative factors”, and “its clarity, it’s precision”. The judges 
used a number of terms to express this idea.  
- 8 responses referred to the report’s shortcomings and lack of precision, identifying oversights and weaknesses 
in the report. The terms used express the notions of “lack” and “absence”, citing, for example, the “absence of 
tests” or the report’s “incomplete nature”.  
-In CwithN - 7 responses did not answer the question or evoked difficulties in adopting a position: “difficult to 
adopt a position on these questions without knowing more about the case and hearing what the accused has to 
say”.  
- 3 responses criticized the neuroscientific data:  “data relating to the morphological analysis and to the brain 
cannot be considered reliable given the current state of medical research”. 
- 16 judges were firmly of the view that the report was credible, as demonstrated by the “different aspects on 
which it is based”, the combination of “medical history, personal observation, tests, examination of the case, 
neurological examinations”, and “the absence of contradictions”. Other judges cited the report’s “coherence” 
with respect to its different components: “the arguments appear relevant and coherent, related to the facts and 
the defendant’s life history. The unusual combination of ‘clinical’ and ‘neurological’ aspects is interesting”, or the 
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“analysis with concordant complementary data from different fields (psychiatric, psychological, neurological)”. 
The most frequently used adjective to describe the evidence was “coherent”. The judges’ assessments of the 
report as being credible appear to have been influenced by the idea that it combines data from different sources 
(clinical, life history, and neurobiological data) and the fact that this data is not contradictory.  
 
3.3.2. Persuasiveness of the report 
The second open question asked the judges to comment on the persuasiveness of the report. Again, we 
found opposing trends between the two conditions. In CwithoutN, a majority of the judges said they had not 
found the report persuasive, whereas most of the judges in the CwithN condition said it was persuasive.  
-In CwithoutN - 9 judges said they felt that the report was not persuasive and gave a variety of reasons for this, 
including: “there is barely any reasoning”; “the lack of foundation for the diagnosis, the lack of demonstration, 
there is nothing about reoffending”. The most frequently used terms are those evoking negation (“there isn’t”, 
“there’s nothing”, “the lack”), which were used to highlight the report’s weaknesses and defects. 
- 3 judges said the report was persuasive: “The medical history is complete, suggesting that the expert took the 
time to get to know M. Quite convincing link between M’s personal history and his relation with V”. The other 
responses (N=5/17) did not answer the question that was asked.  
-In CwithN - 17 responses mentioned aspects of the report that made it persuasive: “logical, coherent, clear, 
objective”; “absence of value judgments, very professional, concordance between different elements”; “the 
neuroscientific data objectivize the act. The medical aspects give it extra credit because they clarify the 
psychological analysis”. The most frequently used terms are “logical” and “coherent”. Overall, the judges 
appeared to view neuroscience data as objective and therefore capable of providing objective support for 
psychological and psychiatric data. 
- 6 responses questioned the value of the neuroscientific data, for example: “skeptical about the neurological 
aspect, which is a little too hypothetical”. 
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- 9 “other” responses repeated sentences from the report without commenting on its persuasiveness.  
 
3.3.3. Scientificity of the report 
 The third open question asked the judges to comment on the degree to which they felt the report was 
scientific. Here, too, there were opposing trends between the two conditions. 
-In CwithoutN - 9 of the 17 responses mentioned “the lack of references to the literature or to the methods used”; 
“no links between the literature and the activity of the subject, no scientific justifications for the statements 
made”; “absence of references to tests”. Terms such as “lack” and negative adverbs such as “not” were 
prevalent. From a thematic point of view, the report’s shortcomings were expressed in terms of its failure to 
state the tools used and its lack of references to the scientific literature.  
- 3 judges felt that it “met criteria in the field”.  
- 4 judges did not answer the question asked.  
-In CwithN - 29 of the 35 responses said that the report was scientific, as it combined psychological and 
psychiatric data with neurobiological data: ”the expert cites a battery of tests: medical examinations (MRI) and 
the ICD-10. Hence, the diagnosis is based on scientific data”; “use of scientific measurement tools (neurological 
tests) and analysis tools used in the human sciences (psychology)”. Other answers mentioned the presence of 
“objective bases, based on recognized norms”; “the interview is precise, the neurological data are objective”. 
Several answers referred to overall impressions: “the analysis appears to be based on a scientific approach”; “it 
is based on a convincing clinical picture”.  
- 3 answers questioned the lack of explicit links between the neuroscientific data and the violent behavior, 
without expressing an opinion on whether or not the report was scientific: “physical tests but a lot of 
descriptions, few links drawn between the test results and the disorders described. What treatment should be 
given now?”; “I can’t say because I have not seen any demonstration of the link between the brain lesion and 
impulse-control disorders”.  
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- 3 “other” responses.  
 
4. Discussion  
To our knowledge, in European countries with inquisitorial systems, this is the first study attempting to 
explore the Swiss and French professional judges’ perceptions of a psychiatric evaluation of a criminal 
defendant, according to whether or not this evaluation includes neuroscientific data. Based on the quantitative 
and qualitative results of this research, we can make the hypothesis that the written neurobiological data 
included in the expertise affects the judges' responses. However, these results should be considered as 
preliminary results to be confirmed with a control case in which we will introduce other data. 
The results of this study may be related to cognitive biases described in the literature (Munro & Munro, 
2015; Simonton, 2009; Weisberg et al., 2008), in particular the perceived scientific nature of neuroscience data 
(its visual nature – brain scans – was not examined in this study). In the case we studied, including such data 
significantly modified judges’ perceptions of the quality, credibility, and scientificity (reliability, objectivity, 
scientific basis) of the report, and the persuasiveness of the evidence it provided. Moreover, this phenomenon 
was stronger in more experienced judges than in less experienced judges. In CwithN, more experienced judges 
were more likely than less experienced judges to view the report as relevant, reliable, credible, scientific, high 
quality, and persuasive. Hence, judges with more experience of assessing expert reports appear more disposed 
to give credit to this new form of expert report containing neuroscience data.  
 
Qualitative analyses of the discourse have shown changes between the two conditions with 
neuroscience data and without neuroscience data. Some of these changes are similar to those found in other 
studies that analyze the effect of neuroscience (Weisberg et al., 2008; Munro & Munro, 2015) on the perception 
of reasoning. 
A greater ability to recognize shortcomings in expert reports when they do not contain neuroscience data 
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 In line with Weisberg (Weisberg et al., 2008) findings concerning perceptions of an argument’s quality, 
judges are more likely to criticize and to find shortcomings and omissions in expert reports when they do not 
contain neuroscience data. Although many of the judges in the CwithoutN group found flaws in the report, few 
of the judges in the CwithN group noted weaknesses, with most perceiving the report to be satisfactory. 
Furthermore, perceptions that the report did not include contradictions and that the dimensions evaluated were 
coherent were stronger for the CwithN report than they were for the CwithoutN report.  
However, the results have shown that a minority of judges cited criticisms of brain imaging data, mentioning 
their unreliability, their hypothetical nature or the lack of a direct link between the brain and violent behavior. 
These criticisms show that some judges question the contribution of neuroscience to understanding behaviors 
and the fact that they are aware of some of their limitations. 
 
Expert reports including neuroscience data are perceived as more scientific 
Globally, including neuroscience data increased perceptions that the report was scientific (Munro & 
Munro, 2015). When asked to state why they felt the report was scientific, many arguments provided by the 
CwithN group evoked the “objective” nature of neuroscience data. Here, the notion of objective has a double 
meaning.  
First, “objective” is used in the sense of objectifying traditional data: neurobiological data, due to their 
supposed biological basis, may be seen as objectifying psychological and psychiatric data and thus as “physical” 
support for psychological and psychiatric conclusions. Hence, including neuroscience data may be perceived as 
making psychological evaluations more reliable, more coherent, and more scientific. 
Second, it is also used in contrast to the notion of subjective, indicating a reality that is constructed in 
the mind, rather than to an “incontrovertible” external reality. Hence, the reality revealed by a psychological 
evaluation may be considered subjective because it is constructed from clinical signs (used to detect personality 
traits, disorders, or tendencies relating to the actions for which the subject is on trial, or the subject’s 
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responsibility for his or her actions) and “clues” perceived in the subject’s life history. In contrast, neuroscience 
data are perceived as providing an objective and faithful vision of reality because it is produced by a machine 
(MRI scanner, PET Scanner, etc.) and therefore thought to be exempt from interpretation. 
However, it is important to remember that neuroscience data is also the result of interpretation, as the 
raw images provided by brain scanners are meaningless until they have been interpreted and this is especially 
true in case studies. For example, the results of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans are not 
direct observations (Roskies, 2006) even though the method uses high technology, the raw data from every scan 
has to be interpreted - data never speak for themselves. The scanner measures variations in blood flow, volume, 
and oxygen content, which are then converted into an image by applying a series of statistical analyses, each of 
which can introduce errors (Aguirre, 2014). The resulting image must then be interpreted by a human being. In 
addition, most of the hypotheses on which interpretations of neuroscience data are based (e.g., causal relations 
between the brain and the mind) are still controversial. 
In an earlier study of real cases (coming mainly from an adversarial system) involving expert reports 
including neuroscience data(Gkotsi et al., 2018; Moulin et al., 2017), we noted that expert witnesses would often 
provide contradictory interpretations of a single set of empirical evidence. In addition, in many of the cases 
examined in this previous study, experts often found it difficult to meet the Frye or Daubert (de Munagorri, 
1999) standards for admitting evidence (the degree of scientific consensus about the validity of an analysis 
method or diagnosis technique required for evidence to be admissible). All these factors argue against the idea 
that neuroscientific data are “more objective and more solid proof” capable of producing more reliable 
conclusions than analyses carried out in “softer” sciences such as psychology and psychiatry(Gkotsi et al., 2018). 
Rather, they highlight the uncertainty and interpretative nature of neuroimaging data. These results raise 
epistemological questions about how evidence is constructed and how the supposed scientific character of 
certain types of evidence affects the way it is perceived.  
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Our results suggest that neuroscience data are rarely questioned by judges (or marginally in relation to all 
responses). We can hypothesize that these results are related to the inquisitorial system. Inquisitorial systems 
are used primarily in countries with civil legal systems as opposed to common law systems. In the inquisitorial 
system, the judge is at the center of the investigation: they represent society and have an active role in preparing 
evidence, questioning witnesses and finding the truth. Unlike the adversarial model, in the inquisitorial system, 
serving justice goes beyond the interests of the parties of the trial and is very important for society, which is 
represented by a third entity that plays a role during the criminal trial: the public prosecutor's office (that is 
entitled, for example, to appeal a judgment). The victim also constitutes an integral part of the criminal trial; 
victims can lodge of a complaint submitted with or without a claim for criminal indemnification(Beliveau & 
Pradel, 2007). In the inquisitorial system, only the judge is entitled to appoint an expert. During the pre-trial 
phase (investigation phase), it is the prosecutor or investigating judge who appoints the expert (The expert can 
then be solicited later in the procedure during the execution of the sentence and also at the end of serving the 
sentence). The expert is committed to the judge who appointed them to fulfill their mission. The inquisitorial 
system is based on the free assessment of data and evidence by the judges, and the expert is appointed by the 
judge from a list of experts competent in the field in question. More, the judge is considered as not competent 
to evaluate the work of the expert but he is also not obliged to follow their expertise either. The expert does not 
have to justify the methods, tools or techniques used or their possible margin of error with regards to the data 
of the scientific community. In the adversarial system, the judge must verify the reliability of the expert 
testimony : experts are appointed and paid by the parties. Because of the diversity in opinions, it may fall to the 
judge to rule on scientific controversies. Depending on the country or state, specific rules are put in place. In the 
USA, from 1923, the Frye standard is a test to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence. It provides that 
expert opinion based on a scientific technique is admissible only where the technique is generally accepted as 
reliable in the relevant scientific community. In 1985, the DAUBERT decision specifies the requirements vis-à-vis 
the experts. Four axes specify the criteria required for the "testimony" of the expert to be admissible: the factors 
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that may be considered in determining whether the methodology is valid are: (1) whether the theory or 
technique in question can be and has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and 
publication; (3) its known or potential error rate; (4) whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a 
relevant scientific community. These differences in professional practices within the two systems could explain 
why the judges studied are less critical of the data introduced in the expert reports because they do not have to 
verify the data that can be used in the trial.   
 
An opposite effect to simplification and reductionism: greater consistency and coupling of data 
In contrast to the cognitive bias towards simplification described in the literature (Crommelinck, 1995), 
according to which associating a phenomenon with neurobiological causes should result in it being perceived in 
more simple terms, the judges in the CwithN group considered the expert report to be credible, persuasive, and 
scientific because it combined numerous coherent and non-contradictory elements (clinical, medical history, 
neurobiological). Hence, rather than differentiating between the dimensions and reducing the reasoning to a 
physical, neurobiological argument (more analytical conception(Pourtois & Desmet, 2007), which tends to 
simplify analyses by dividing them into ever smaller units), introducing neurobiological data triggers more 
“systemic” perceptions and conceptions (Morin & Le Moigne, 1999; Pourtois & Desmet, 2007), which 
reintroduces complexity by taking into account the different units and the links between them. By providing a 
biological “basis” for the report’s findings, the neuroscience data strengthens the reader’s confidence in the 
interpretation of the clinical signs and the clues provided by the subject’s life history, and in the coherence of 
the data provided.  
 
Does including neuroscientific information reduce the ability to critically assess expert reports?  
 Several studies of European judges (Mouchet & Pillonel, 2016; Moulin et al., 2017; V. Moulin & Palaric, 
2013; Palaric & Moulin, 2014) have shown that judges base their room for maneuver and their freedom to 
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“criticize” an expert report on the clarity of its reasoning, the absence of contradictions, and its persuasiveness. 
Judges maintain that they do not have the expertise to question methods or conclusions based on scientific 
expertise [in inquisitorial criminal systems, experts with specific technical and scientific knowledge (attested by 
a registration procedure or specialist qualifications) are considered “legal auxiliaries” and are completely 
neutral. Furthermore, judges are considered unqualified to rule on scientific questions (Byk, 2012; Canivet, 2000; 
Garapon, 2005; Hureau, 2008)]. Because neuroscience data increases perceptions of the coherence of 
arguments, the absence of contradictions, and the presence of logical links between different elements, can 
unintentionally reduce judges’ abilities to question and/or counter expert reports. Neuroscience data can also 
make evidence more difficult to understand, thereby affecting judges’ abilities to analyze it critically. 
 
Limitations   
 Several limitations must be mentioned. First, the results cannot be generalized because the sample size 
was too small. Increasing the sample size, especially in the CwithoutN, so the two groups were of comparative 
size, would provide more reliable and accurate results. So, the results should be considered preliminary results 
to be confirmed. Second, the observed changes could be related to the simple fact of adding data. Whatever 
the type of data entered. However, the qualitative responses at least partially refute this interpretation based 
solely on the amount of information, as the basis for the difference in judges' perceptions. Third, we did not 
include a control group presented with another type of data (e.g., biological), so we were unable to determine 
whether or not the effects we found were related specifically to neuroscience data. It would also be interesting 
to determine whether effects vary with different types of neuroscience data. 
 
Conclusion  
Neuroscience data, especially neuroimaging data, are already admissible as evidence in criminal 
proceedings in the United States and many other countries. Although the last ten years have seen spectacular 
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technological and scientific advances in this field, scientists are still a long way from understanding fully how the 
brain functions and from establishing firm links between brain function and an individual’s psychological or 
psychopathological state(Gkotsi et al., 2018). When neuroscience data is admitted as evidence in criminal trials, 
experts frequently disagree over how these data should be interpreted and over possible links between the data 
and the acts of which a defendant is accused (Chandler, 2016; Greene & Cahill, 2012; Witzel, Walter, Bogerts, & 
Northoff, 2008). The results of our study, carried out on judges working within inquisitorial criminal systems, 
which do not have Frye- or Daubert-type standards for the admissibility of expert testimony, show that scientific 
data can impact decision-making processes, especially in the case of professional judges with many years’ 
experience. Hence, members of the legal profession must be trained in how to recognize the strengths and 
weaknesses of this new type of expert report without allowing its perceived objectivity to cloud their critical 
faculties. Only by correctly assessing neuroscience data, while remaining aware of its potential impact on their 
evaluative and decision-making processes, will they be able to exploit its potential contribution to evaluating 
and explaining behaviors. Although judges are mindful of their limits when it comes to assessing technical data, 
they appear relatively unaware that scientific data can induce cognitive biases and thereby affect their 
perceptions of expert reports.  
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Appendices to the text 
 
Differences concerning the position and the status of expert and judges in Adversarial and an Inquisitorial 
Legal Systems 
The position of the judge and the expert, as well as the status of the expert, are different between the 
inquisitorial and the adversarial system. Since inquisitorial and adversarial system attribute investigation duties 
to judges and the parties respectively, the status of the experts is different in each system: forensic expert and 
expert witness. In the inquisitorial system, experts must have previously acquired knowledge and skills that allow 
them to fulfill their mission and to be appointed by judges. In Switzerland and France, experts are considered 
specialists in their field and are required to regularly demonstrate their skills and training in order to be able to 
practice as experts (in Switzerland obtaining a specialization in legal psychiatry or psychology and in France by 
registering in special lists of experts) (Palaric et al 2014). In the adversarial system, for example in the United 
States, the parties may suggest the expert of their choice. It is still however up to the judge to check the skills of 
the expert (Blumrosen & Hertz-Béjot, 2007). As a result the contract does not bind the expert to the judge, but 
directly to the parties who appoint them, since it is their responsibility to fulfill the expert missions. 
In Switzerland, ordering an expertise in the context of criminal adjudications is a regulated practice. For example, 
in the pre-sentence phase, the Penal Code mentions that the examining authority or the judge order an expert’s 
assessment if there are serious doubts about the author's legal capacity (Article 20 Penal Code). In France, the 
expert’s services must be solicited for certain categories of offense, The expert is expected to bring technical 
elements about specific points. When judges are dissatisfied by an expertise, they can ask for a complementary 
one or call on a new expert (“contre-expertise”). 
In the adversarial system, experts are appointed and paid by the parties. Because of the diversity in opinions, it 
may fall to the judge to rule on scientific controversies. Depending on the country or state, specific rules are put 
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in place. In the USA, from 1923, the Frye standard is a test to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence. 
It provides that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is admissible only where the technique is generally 
accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community. In 1985, the DAUBERT decision specifies the 
requirements vis-à-vis the experts. Four axes specify the criteria required for the "testimony" of the expert to 
be admissible: the factors that may be considered in determining whether the methodology is valid are: (1) 
whether the theory or technique in question can be and has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to 
peer review and publication; (3) its known or potential error rate; (4) whether it has attracted widespread 
acceptance within a relevant scientific community. 
 
The judge must verify the reliability of the expert testimony. For this purpose, meetings between experts, judges 
and the parties (testimony) take place before the trial, during which the experts demonstrate their methodology. 
In the inquisitorial system, the judge is considered as not competent to evaluate the work of the expert but he 
is also not obliged to follow their expertise either. The expert does not have to justify the methods, tools or 
techniques used or their possible margin of error with regards to the data of the scientific community. He is free 
to use the techniques and tools that he prefers. 
The development of the "Judicial Truth" (Byk, 2012, Canivet, 2000) is based on the principle of contradictory 
debates and the confrontation of points of view. In the inquisitorial system the judge freely appreciates 
evidence. Scientific data can help to construct the "legal truth", which, however, may not be reduced to these 
and judges are free to distance themselves itself from scientific data. They are led to "interpret the scientific 
facts in the light of their reasoned intimate conviction" (Byk, 2012). 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the study population 
 Swiss judges French judges Swiss and  French 
judges 
Number 21 41 62 
Age (mean) 44 years 44.5 years 44 years 
Sex 14 men 
7 women 
13 men 
28 women 
27 men 
35 women 
Years’ experience 
(mean) 
13.7 years 12.9 years 13.0 years 
Position 
Prosecutor 
Examining judge 
Trial judge 
 
 
15 prosecutors 
 
7 trial judges 
 
 
19 examining judges 
22 trial judges 
 
15 prosecutors 
19 examining judges 
22 trial judges 
 
 
Table n°2: Differences between the With and Without neuroscientific data conditions 
 Without N=22 With N=40 F p 
Relevance 4.30 (1.38) 5.89 (0.92) 27.53 < .001 
Credibility 4.50 (1.38) 5.40 (1.34) 5.42 .024 
Quality 4.05 (1.40) 5.71 (1.06) 26.75 < .001 
Objectivity 5.14 (1.15) 6.04 (0.92) 10.65 .002 
Reliability 4.50 (1.43) 5.80 (1.04) 15.81 < .001 
Persuasiveness 4.32 (1.20) 5.61 (1.02) 17.78 < .001 
Scientificity 3.55 (1.61) 5.32 (1.29) 20.31 < .001 
Means, (standard deviation), F ratios and p values for the quantitative assessments of the reports With vs. Without 
neuroscientific data 
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Table n°3: Conditional effects of professional experience in the With and Without neuroscientific data 
conditions 
 Without With 
 Effect (SE) t Effect (SE) t 
Relevance -0.01 (0.04) -0.07 0.04 (0.02) 2.41* 
Credibility -0.05 (0.05) -1.09 0.06 (0.02) 2.91** 
Quality -0.02 (0.04) -0.61 0.05 (0.02) 2.68** 
Objectivity 0.02 (0.03) 0.55 0.02 (0.02) 1.45 
Reliability -0.06 (0.04) -1.36 0.04 (0.02) 2.15* 
Persuasiveness -0.03 (0.03) - 0.80 0.05 (0.02) 2.84** 
Scientificity -0.02 (0.05) - 0.40 0.05 (0.02 2.15* 
* p <.05 ** p < .01 
 
 
Table n°4 : Terminological and thematic analyses. 
Conditions 
 
Questions 
Without neuroscientific data condition 
N=22 
With neuroscientific data condition 
N=40 
Credibility 
 
14 responses 36 responses 
Terminological 5 : credible  
various terms 
3 responses criticized neuroscientific data:  
"data not credible and unreliable" 
Thematic Taking into account a variety of dimensions lack of scientificity  
Terminological 8 : no credible : terms used express the notions of “lack” 
and “absence”, 
16 responses credible : most frequent adjective :  
"coherent" 
Thematic The lack  Combination of data from different sources 
 Other : 1 response Other : 7 responses 
Persuasiveness 17 responses  
 
35 responses  
 
Terminological 9: no persuasive: words speak of negation: “There is 
nothing” 
17. persuasive: “logical” and “coherent” 
Thematic Weaknesses and defects Consistency and not contradiction between the data 
Terminological 3: persuasive 6 responses questioned the value of the neuroscientific 
data: various terms 
Thematic complete and demonstrative lack of scientific basis 
 Other : 5responses,  does not answer the question asked Other : 9 responses, does not answer the question asked 
Scientificity 
 
17 responses  35 responses  
Terminological 9 :  non scientific, Terms such as “lack” and "negative"  
adverbs such as “not”  
29 : persuasive.   
Terms: rigour, science, scientists 
Thematic The report’s shortcomings were expressed in terms of  
its failure to state the tools used and its lack of  
references to the scientific literature. 
Scientific approach, persuasive 
Terminological 3 : Scientific : rigour and science.  3 responses : lack of explicit links between  
neuroscientific data and violent behavior  
Thematic Correspondence between the representation of science  
and the content of the report.  
Lack of links 
 
